Submissions, Evidence & Reform · Simon Peers

This is the author’s retained Rev1 text, labelled ‘Controlled draft’ in its original document. Simon Peers reports submitting his consultation response on 16 October 2026. The draft label is preserved here as part of the provenance.


Independent Assurance, Accountability and Organisational Learning Consultation response: Revised Lord Advocate’s Code of Practice on Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings

Simon Peers | Rewiring the Public Sector | 16 October 2026 | Controlled draft — Rev 1

I welcome the opportunity to comment on the proposed revision of the Lord Advocate’s Code of Practice on Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings.

I write as a member of the public who has experienced the Scottish criminal justice system as an accused person, subsequently acquitted, and who has spent approximately 37 years working in the electronics industry, including technical management, quality assurance, business development and continuous improvement.

My contribution is intended to be constructive. I believe the proposed Code presents an opportunity not simply to improve disclosure procedures, but to strengthen confidence that those procedures operate effectively in practice.

1. Compliance is not the same as effectiveness A written procedure can be followed without necessarily producing the intended outcome.

In engineering and quality management, procedural compliance is only one element of assurance. Effective systems also require monitoring, identification of non-conformances, root- cause analysis, corrective action and independent verification.

I suggest that the revised Disclosure Code should be supported by a clear framework demonstrating how compliance and effectiveness will be assessed.

2. Independent assurance My principal concern is the extent to which COPFS remains responsible for assessing the effectiveness of its own procedures.

Internal review is necessary, but it should not be the sole means of assurance.

I therefore invite consideration of an independent mechanism capable of examining significant disclosure failures, identifying systemic weaknesses and verifying that corrective action has been implemented.

Such scrutiny need not interfere with prosecutorial independence.

3. Recording and traceability Disclosure decisions should leave an auditable record identifying:

 The information considered and the decision reached.  The reasons for the decision.  The responsible decision-maker.  Subsequent reviews and changes.  Any identified failure and resulting corrective action.

This would improve consistency, transparency and the ability to identify recurring problems.

4. Learning following completed proceedings The conclusion of criminal proceedings should not automatically mean the conclusion of organisational learning.

Where a prosecution ends in acquittal, discontinuation or another non-conviction outcome, credible concerns about disclosure should be capable of triggering an appropriate process review.

An acquittal does not itself establish that a disclosure failure occurred. Equally, it does not establish that every aspect of the prosecution process operated correctly.

The purpose of review should be to identify and prevent avoidable recurrence, not to challenge the court’s verdict.

5. Independent reconsideration without interference I have developed a proposed model under which an independent oversight body, potentially the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman following appropriate legislative reform, could require reconsideration where a sufficiently serious procedural concern is established.

The prosecutorial decision would remain exclusively with COPFS.

The principle is straightforward:

Information passes; control does not.

This is comparable to an optocoupler in electronics, which allows information to cross an isolation barrier without creating a direct electrical connection between two independently operating circuits.

6. Closing the organisational-learning loop I suggest that any significant disclosure-related non-conformance should follow a defined sequence:

Identification → Root cause → Corrective action → Responsible owner → Implementation → Independent verification → Effectiveness review.

A recommendation alone is not evidence that a problem has been resolved.

There should also be an appropriate mechanism for aggregating anonymised findings across cases and reporting recurring systemic issues.

7. Questions for the consultation I would particularly welcome clarification of the following:

 What independent mechanism will verify the effective implementation of the revised Code?  How will recurring disclosure failures be identified across individual prosecutions?  What arrangements exist for reviewing significant disclosure concerns after proceedings have concluded?  Who will be accountable for ensuring corrective actions are implemented and verified?  Will COPFS publish anonymised information about disclosure-related failures, remedial actions and their effectiveness?  How will the consultation responses be evaluated, and will COPFS publish its reasons for accepting or rejecting substantive reform proposals?

Conclusion My purpose is not to undermine the independence of Scotland’s prosecution service. On the contrary, I believe meaningful independent assurance can strengthen that independence by improving transparency, consistency and public confidence.

The distinction I would encourage COPFS to consider is:

Writing the rules is governance. Following the rules is compliance. Independently demonstrating that the rules work is assurance.

I hope these observations will be considered in the final Code and in the wider arrangements supporting its implementation.

I would appreciate acknowledgement of this submission and confirmation that it will form part of the formal consultation record.

Simon Peers Rewiring the Public Sector — Independent Research and Systems Accountability

Reference: COPFS consultation on the revised Lord Advocate’s Code of Practice on Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings. This submission proposes additional assurance arrangements; it does not describe them as existing statutory powers.

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